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Decentralization is among the most important global trends of the new century, yet there is still no
consensus on how to design political institutions to realize its benefits. In this paper, we investigate the
political conditions under which decentralization will improve the delivery of public goods. We begin by
incorporating insights from political science and economics into a rigorous and formal extension of the
“decentralization theorem”. Our extension assumes inter-jurisdictional spillovers and suggests that the
interaction of democratic decentralization (popularly elected sub-national governments) and party
centralization (the power of national party leaders over subnational office-seekers) will produce the best
outcomes for public service delivery. To test this argument empirically, we make use of a new dataset of
sub-national political institutions created for this project. Our analyses, which allow us to examine
educational outcomes in more than 125 countries across more than 25 years, provide support for our
theoretical expectations.
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As more and more of the world’s states devolve power and resources to sub-national governments,
decentralization is emerging as one of the most important global trends of the new century. Yet there is
still no consensus concerning the benefits of decentralization and how to design institutions that can realize
these benefits. In this paper, we investigate the political conditions under which this trend towards
decentralization will improve the delivery of public goods. We begin by incorporating insights from
political science and economics into a rigorous and formal extension of the “decentralization theorem”.
This theorem, which points to the efficiency benefits of sub-national provision of public goods, was first
developed by Oates (1972) and has influenced virtually all of the literature over the past four decades.
In his theorem, Oates assumes, among other things, the absence of inter-jurisdictional spillovers in
the centralized provision of local public goods. Our extension goes beyond Oates by producing a “strong
decentralization theorem” in which the provision of local public goods by a system of sub-national
governments can be welfare superior to centralized provision even under spillovers of local public
spending. Further, it finds that these beneficial outcomes for public service delivery will hold when
democratic decentralization (i.e. the creation of popularly elected sub-national governments) is combined
with party centralization (i.e. the power of national party leaders to nominate candidates for sub-national
office). Democratic decentralization creates the accountability necessary for efficient public goods
provision, while party centralization increases local governments’ incentives to provide public goods with
spillover effects. We also find that democratic decentralization combined with party decentralization and
open primaries leads to the hypothesized benefits of decentralization, but that democratic decentralization
and party decentralization with closed primaries, in general, does not.
To test these arguments empirically, we make use of a new dataset of sub-national political
institutions created for this project. Up to this point, scholars interested in sub-national political institutions
have been forced to focus on single cases (especially the United States) or to assume that national level
political institutions across countries are replicated at the sub-national level. Our new dataset allows us to
examine how the structure of municipal politics influences educational outcomes (our proxy for public
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goods provision) in more than 125 countries across more than 25 years. This empirical analysis, to our
knowledge the broadest quantitative exploration of sub-national politics in the literature, provides support
for our theoretical expectations.
In the scholarly world, our project has the potential to provide a new, interdisciplinary
understanding of the implications of decentralization, overcoming some of the gap between work in
political science and economics. In addition, we hope that our dataset will be of use to future studies that
relate political institutions to outcomes at the sub-national level. Moreover, our project has the potential to
influence thinking in the broader community of development practitioners. In the developing world,
decentralization reforms have been strongly encouraged and assisted by the efforts of bilateral donor
agencies and international financial institutions, many of which have made decentralization promotion a
priority. These agencies, in turn, have been spurred on in their efforts by much of the scholarly literature,
which emphasizes the beneficial effects of decentralization for the provision of public goods. Our project
has the potential to provide a better understanding of which types of political institutions may be necessary
for decentralization reforms to produce fuller results.

Review of the Literature
As noted above, decentralization is becoming a prominent global trend; countries which have
engaged in decentralization reforms include China, Indonesia, South Africa, India, the United Kingdom,
and many others. These reforms, at least in the developing world, have been supported both by the aid
dollars of multilateral and bilateral agencies such as the World Bank and USAID, and by the research
findings of many scholars. Central to these positive scholarly judgments is the “decentralization theorem,”
which was developed by Oates (1972) and states that “. . . in the absence of cost-savings from the
centralized provision of a (local public) good and of inter-jurisdictional externalities, the level of welfare
will always be at least as high (and typically higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of consumption are provided
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in each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of consumption is maintained across all
jurisdictions”(p.54).
As the process of decentralization has continued apace, however, some scholars have begun to
question whether devolving authority to regional and local governments is a universal good. Among other
things, they have pointed out that Oates, in developing his famous theorem, assumed a benevolent, welfaremaximizing government. While this assumption may have been useful for creating a simple and elegant
theory of decentralization, it hardly accords with empirical realities. More to the point, it begs the question
of how different political processes and institutions might shape the fiscal choices made by policy makers.
While these problems have been increasingly acknowledged and confronted in the “second generation”
research on decentralization, there is still little systematic work on which political institutions lead to the
social welfare gains expected of decentralization by Oates (1972).2
We begin our exploration of the existing literature with an examination of what economists and
political scientists (sometimes on parallel tracks) have said about decentralization and its efficiency
implications. We then move to the broader literature on political institutions, party organization, and public
goods provision, nearly all of which has developed with reference to national governments and apart from
the study of decentralization. We conclude our review of the literature by highlighting the relative absence
of work that considers how specific political institutions such as electoral rules and local representation
might mediate the effects of decentralization on efficiency outcomes.
Modern research on decentralization began with Tiebout’s landmark 1956 study, which argued that
a decentralized system of public service delivery can maximize efficiency by allowing government services
to vary according to the preferences of citizens in different jurisdictions. Oates picked up on this idea and
qualified it in his 1972 formulation of the decentralization theorem, and scholars have since spent
significant time improving or critiquing his argument and testing its empirical merit. For example, Breton
(2002), Treisman (2007), Lockwood (2002), and Besley and Coate (2003) have examined whether central
2

For more on second generation research on fiscal federalism, see Weingast (2009) and Oates (2005).
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governments could themselves target public goods delivery to regional preferences, while Bardhan (2002)
and Manor (1999) are skeptical that individuals will move to regions that provide the policies they prefer.
Others assert that decentralization increases opportunities for corruption (Treisman 2000, 2007; Tanzi
2002) and can be counter-productive if sub-national civil servants are not sufficiently professionalized
(Shah 2003, Manor 1999).
Another group of economists (e.g. Weingast 1995) emphasizes the utility of decentralization
because it generates a healthy competition among jurisdictions. Those that are most efficient at public
good delivery will find new citizens, they argue, whereas those that govern poorly will find their
populations and tax bases shriveled. Of course, like the arguments made by Tiebout and Oates, this
argument has attracted its share of critics, especially among those who fear that decentralization could
produce an inequitable distribution of goods (Prud’Homme 1995), exacerbate regional enmities (Treisman
1999, von Braun and Grote 2002), or lead to local elite capture (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000). Many
scholars are also concerned about the possible negative impact of decentralization for a country’s fiscal
balances. For example, Triesman (2000) and Wibbels (2000) find an empirical connection between
federalism and inflation.
Despite the critics, most scholarship in economics and political science, following in the tradition of
Tiebout, Oates, and Weingast, has viewed decentralization positively. For example, many scholars believe
that decentralization has a salutary effect on corruption by promoting transparency and accountability
(Manor 1999, Gurgur and Shah 2002, Crook 2003). Others have highlighted ways in which some of the
potential drawbacks of decentralization can be alleviated. For example, Rodden (2006) recommends that
central governments follow a no-bailout policy without respect to sub-national authorities, thereby forcing
them to internalize the consequences of their fiscal behavior.
On the empirical side, evidence for the proposed link between decentralization and efficiency has
been mixed. Among the skeptics, Strumpf et al. (1999) find little evidence that decentralization in Uganda
has improved health outcomes, Davoodi and Zou (1998) believe that devolving power to sub-national
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governments slows economic growth in developing countries, Schwartz, Guilkey, and Racelis (2002) argue
that decentralization reforms increased health expenditures in the Philippines but resulted in a shift away
from the provision of public health resources, and Parry (1997) is skeptical that decentralization in Chile
has improved educational outcomes. On the positive side, Lewis (1998) associates improved water
delivery with decentralization in Kenya, Habibi et al. (2003) point to evidence that strong sub-national
government reduced infant mortality in Argentina, and Yilmaz (1999), separating federal and unitary
systems, sees a connection between decentralization and economic growth. Studies of Bolivia (Faguet and
Sanchez 2008), Argentina (Habibi et al. 2003), and Indonesia (Simatupang 2009), as well as cross-national
quantitative analyses (Heredia 2006), also point to improved educational outcomes with decentralization.
A reasonable summary, then, is that most scholars continue to see decentralization as a route to
improving the delivery of public goods, but with a number of significant caveats (see Hankla 2009). If the
benefits of decentralization are indeed conditional on other factors, something that many scholars are
beginning to suspect, it could help account for the mixed empirical findings outlined above. Thus far,
however, the literature has spent little time considering how political institutions might matter in mediating
the effects of devolving power to sub-national governments. To lay the groundwork for incorporating these
institutions into our argument, we turn now to a consideration of the broader literature on institutions and
governance in political science.
Political scientists have long investigated the implications of different institutional configurations
for the delivery of public goods, although their efforts have focused almost exclusively on national
governments. Most scholars in this area agree, at least implicitly, that the political institutions likely to
produce positive outcomes are those which expose leaders to popular democratic pressures while insulating
them from particularistic interest groups. In making variations of this broad argument, researchers have
investigated the impact of a number of specific institutions (e.g., electoral systems, legislative-executive
relations, legislative and coalition party fragmentation) on a wide variety of policy outcomes (e.g., free
trade, balanced budgets, energy conservation). To take some examples, Rogowski (1987) draws an
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association between a proportional electoral system with large electoral districts and free trade policies.
Other political scientists have found evidence that strong, democratic executives are more likely to provide
public goods such as free trade (O’Halloran 1994, Nielson 2003), economic liberalization (Haggard and
Kaufman 1995), and balanced budgets (Hallerberg and Marier 2004) than their less insulated counterparts.
In addition, many scholars have associated balanced budgets with low levels of legislative and
governmental party fragmentation (e.g. Roubini and Sachs 1989, Volkerink and de Haan 2001).
The impact of political party organization on policy outcomes, one of the central concerns of this
article, has been much less thoroughly explored in the literature. The little research that has considered
party organization has linked a more centralized structure (with empowered national elites) to public goods
provision. Hankla (2006) and Nielson (2003), for example, argue that democracies with centralized
political parties are more likely to adopt free trade policies, and Hallerberg and Marier (2004) find a
connection between centralized parties and balanced budget in Latin America. Similarly, Hicken and
Simmons (2008) argue that that education spending undertaken by decentralized parties is more
particularistic and less effective. The link is simply that party centralization shifts power from local elites,
who might be tempted to shore-up their support with particularistic goods, to national party leaders, who
have electoral incentives to consider the aggregate national interest.
While nearly all of the research relating party structures with public goods delivery concerns the
national level, some scholars have investigated the causal relationship between party and party system
centralization on the one hand and the empowerment of sub-national governments on the other. For
example, Chhibber and Kollman (2004) make the case that countries devolving more powers to the
subnational level are likely to have more localized party systems, while Fabre et al. (2005) find that such
countries will also be characterized by more decentralized parties. Garman, Haggard, and Willis (2001)
argue for the same relationship moving in the opposite direction; for them the decentralization of parties is
likely to drive greater fiscal decentralization. By contrast, Eaton (2004) and Dickovick (2011) find that the
choice to empower sub-national governments can be driven by the incentives of national party leaders.
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Other scholars have addressed the question of whether and how party structures can contribute to
(or undermine) the stability of federalism. Undoubtedly William Riker is the most prominent scholar to
have taken up this question, arguing in his classic 1964 book that party centralization is among the most
important drivers of federal centralization as a whole. Extending that argument to the United States, Riker
contends in his 1987 book that the American “decentralized party system is the main protector of the
integrity of states in our federalism” (p. 221).3 By contrast, Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova (2004)
emphasize the benefits of more integrated parties, making the case that party systems which successfully
link the national and sub-national levels of government are the best guarantors of a stable federal system.
While all of these scholars have improved our understanding of how partisan and sub-national
institutions interact, their focus has not been on connecting particular sub-national political institutions with
public goods provision. Indeed, there are very few systematic studies in the literature that make this
connection, but it is worth highlighting three influential analyses here. First, Erik Wibbels argues in his
2005 book that the presence of centralized parties facilitates the efforts of national leaders to push subnational governments into market reforms. Second, R. Douglas Hecock (2006) finds a positive relationship
between sub-national political competition and educational spending in Mexico. Third, and perhaps most
related to our own work, Rubin Enikolopov and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2007) conclude, after a crossnational empirical study, that devolving fiscal authority to sub-national governments is more likely to
improve public good (in this case, education) delivery when parties are centralized.
Despite some overlap with our interests here, however, there are a number of significant differences
between our argument and those set forth by these scholars. Turning first to Wibbels (2005), his research
focuses on party centralization as a means of national control within a decentralized political system, on not
on the incentives such structures create for internalizing externalities. In a similar vein, Hecock (2006) is
more interested in the level of partisan competition than in the questions of party organization that we study
here.
3

See also Volden 2004 for an excellent summary of Riker’s thought on Federalism.

Rethinking the Political Economy of Decentralization

9

Moreover, in contrast to Enikolopov and Zhuravshaya, we consider here the interaction between
party centralization and democratic centralization rather than that between party centralization and fiscal
centralization, so our theory is significantly different. In addition, we develop our argument formally using
the decentralization theorem as a base, an approach which gives us more opportunity to leave our mark on
the fundamental theory of decentralization. Finally, we believe that our data, which measures party
decentralization more directly (Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya 2007 use party fragmentation in the national
legislature) and at the sub-national level, more closely hews to theory. We will also make use of additional
control variables for political institutions at the sub-national level and of educational indicators for the
dependent variables that pick-up more directly on educational outcomes.
To summarize, then, the purpose of our research is to merge insights from political science with the
decentralization literature outlined above, all to identify the political conditions needed for realizing the
benefits of decentralization. We turn to developing our theory in the next section.

Development of the Theory
In developing our theory, we begin with the decentralization theorem and expand it formally to
address the implications of different institutional configurations for its efficiency predictions. More
specifically, we consider four distinct cases:
(1) countries that are democratically decentralized (i.e. they have democratically elected sub-national
governments) and party decentralized (i.e. national leaders lack the power to select candidates for
these sub-national elections);
(2) countries that are democratically centralized (i.e. they have no elected sub-national governments)
but party decentralized (i.e. national leaders lack the power to nominate candidates for
constituency elections to the national legislature);
(3) countries that are democratically decentralized (i.e. they have elected sub-national governments)
but party centralized (i.e. national party leaders select candidates for sub-national elections); and
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(4) countries that are democratically centralized (i.e. they have no elected sub-national governments)
and party centralized (i.e. national party leaders nominate candidates to constituency elections for
the national legislature).

In our formal model, we consider decentralized parties to be those that hold open or closed primaries
(modeled separately) to choose candidates, as opposed to having national party leaders nominate them.
While we understand that many decentralized parties in the world have free candidate access to the ballot
(i.e. by collecting signatures or paying a fee) rather than primaries, we believe these decentralized
structures will have many of the same effects as primaries (see Carey and Shugart 1995).
In our model, we extend the decentralization theorem by incorporating inter-jurisdictional spillovers
and find that the benefits of decentralization continue to hold (our “strong decentralization theorem”).
Moreover, the results of our model indicate that the combination of democratic decentralization and party
centralization yields the most efficient provision of public goods.4 The intuition is that democratic
decentralization produces incentives on the part of politicians to provide citizens with the bundle of public
goods that they desire. In other words, as Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972) point out, polities with elected
sub-national governments can better target public services to the desires of their constituents, allowing
bundles of goods to vary across constituency. Of course, having these governments be democratically
elected is the key to ensuring that they are responsive to citizen desires (see Bird and Vaillancourt 1998,
Manor 1999).
Party centralization, on the other hand, has the benefit of increasing the chances that the
externalities of local public goods will be internalized. A common concern about democratic and fiscal
decentralization is that local governments will under-provide public goods whose benefits spillover beyond
their constituencies (e.g., Bird et al. 2003). This is because these governments are unable to internalize and
4

Note, however, that our results indicate that democratic decentralization, when combined with open primaries, also yields
positive outcomes. However, closed primaries are more problematic. As we are unable to differentiate cross-nationally between
open and closed primaries in our empirical estimation, we plan to compare centralized and decentralized parties in the aggregate.
It should also be noted that all of our predictions are based on specific assumptions that we will highlight in our models below.
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profit from the political benefits of providing these goods optimally. The rational policy is instead to
ignore the benefits that arise in other jurisdictions and/or to free-ride on the expenditures of neighboring
districts; in either case the production of public goods will not be optimal. A number of basic public
services, such as primary health, general education, water treatment and environmental protection, are
likely to generate spillover effects and may not receive sufficient financing from local governments.
When parties are centralized, however, sub-national elected leaders do have some incentives to
provide goods that may spillover into neighboring constituencies. National party leaders will be interested
in generating optimal levels of public goods with spillover effects because they are concerned with their
party’s prospects in the country as a whole. In centralized parties, these national leaders have significant
powers, not least of which is nomination power, over sub-national politicians and can push them to supply
these goods.
To summarize, then, sub-national leaders in these systems have two masters whose interests are
sometimes in competition, namely party chiefs in the national capital and local voters in their
constituencies. Without the former, these leaders cannot be nominated and without the latter they cannot
be elected. These competing loyalties produce incentives both to provide differentiated local public goods
and to spend more money on goods with spillover effects. As a result, our argument is that systems that
mix democratic decentralization with party centralization will have the best outcomes, other things equal.
Systems that are centralized in both ways lack sufficient incentives to differentiate and target goods to local
preferences, and systems that are decentralized in both have little incentive to generate optimal levels of
public goods with geographical externalities.
A final question is whether countries that mix centralization and decentralization in the reverse way,
those with no locally elected governments but with decentralized parties, might be able to produce the same
beneficial tension. We think not. Even if politicians elected to the national legislature from local districts
have incentives to concern themselves with local preferences, their ability to force the central government
to differentiate tax and spending bundles for their constituents will be limited. Moreover, theoretical
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models developed by Lockwood (2002) and Besley and Coate (2003) indicate that, while central
governments may provide different constituencies with different bundles of public goods, a more
decentralized approach to decision-making is likely to produce more efficient differentiation.

The Formal Model
In this section, we present our full formal expansion of the decentralization theorem.
The Benchmark
We begin by characterizing the set of local public goods that maximize the aggregate public good
surplus which is our criteria for the comparative analysis of the welfare properties of the fiscally centralized
and decentralized provision of local public goods. This benchmark allows us to compare our results with
the normative analysis of Oates (1972) and recent political economy analysis (see Besley and Coate 2003
and Lookwood 2008).
Consider an economy constituted by districts and – with

individuals in each

district. Households do not have mobility across jurisdictions. The preferences of a household with an
endowment

in district is

subject to

, where
over a private good
district ,

,
,

, and where

is a head tax on residents of district

, measures the extent of inter-regional spillovers of

residents of district . For local public goods without spillovers
spending in district

are his preferences

is the overall consumption of local public goods provided by

, and by district

The parameter

is the individual´s indirect utility,

and

, and

over
when local

is over a nationwide pure public good. Condition (a) is the individual’s budget

constraint. The distribution of heterogeneous endowments across districts is given by
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. Condition (b),
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is the constraint

that public goods are financed by taxes.5
The nationwide welfare for this economy is given by:

Let
definite Hessian of

such that
. For

. We assume
then

is a negative

is a global maximizer of

in the

constrained policy set.
Proposition 1 characterizes a set of local public goods with and without spillovers that are Pareto
efficient and exhaust the gains attributed to matching the size of local public spending according to the
heterogeneous preferences of households over public goods.

Proposition 1. The Pareto efficient local public goods

that match the heterogeneous

preferences of households across districts satisfy:

Proof.
Find

and re-arrange terms to obtain the result in (2).

In (2) local public goods with and without spillovers are provided at the point in which the marginal
social gains in both districts from a marginal change in

5

(equivalent to the change in utility of

The government´s budget constraints say that is financed by a head tax applied only to residents of the district. This
configuration allows us to eliminate any possible gains of economies of scale in the provision of local public goods by the central
government over sub-national governments. We impose this condition to evaluate whether the Decentralization Theorem of
Oates (1972) holds in modern democracies once we introduce political institutions and incentives instead of governments
controlled by benevolent social planners.

14

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series

residents of district

and due to inter-regional spillovers the change in utility of

residents of district –

) is equal to the social marginal costs,
of financing local spending through taxation. At

the aggregate surplus

from local public goods is maximized.

Party Centralization in a Single Unit of Government
In this section we develop a two stage model of electoral competition for a democracy with party
centralization. The parties’ problem is to aggregate the heterogeneous and conflicting preferences of voters
for public spending into a policy platform that maximizes the parties’ probabilities of winning the election.
In the first stage, candidates announce policies and party leaders nominate the candidate that will run in the
general election with the party label. We do not model the decision of citizens to become candidates, we
simply assume two candidates in each party look for the nomination of their parties. For an economy with
party centralization, party leaders have full command on policy making by nominating only those
candidates who adopt the ideal fiscal policy of party leaders. In the second stage of the political process,
voters observe the parties’ policies and elect a public official in the general election. All individuals vote.
Two parties, labeled

and

, compete in the election to form the government in a majoritarian

electoral system with single member districts. The winning candidate takes all, forms the government, and
designs policy. Under a central government, local public goods are provided by a single government that
represents voters of all districts. The government finances its budget expenditures through a uniform tax on
residents of all districts. We follow the literature by assuming that local public goods provided by the
central government are uniform across districts (see Oates 1972, 1995).
In the second stage of the electoral process, individuals vote for the party that advances the
spending policy that is closest to their own views on public spending. Denote
where

is the difference in the voter’s payoff if party

is elected and implements
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in districts and

is elected. The voter type
flips a fair coin if
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instead of the alternative policies

votes for party

if

, if

when party –

and

he votes for party – , and the voter

.

From the point of view of parties, the individual’s choice of the vote is uncertain. The probability
that a voter type

votes for party in district is

continuous probability distribution over

, where

. The expected vote of party in district is

and the expected vote in both districts is

. Define

as a continuous cumulative distribution over the plurality of the party,
and

is a

, where

is the probability distribution over the party´s plurality.

The equilibrium provision of local public goods for a democracy with a majoritarian electoral
system, party centralization, and a nationwide election to form the central government,

, is characterized

in proposition 2. Under our assumptions, Downsian parties converge in their fiscal platforms since they
maximize a continuous an strictly concave probability of winning the election in the constrained policy set
based on a common system of beliefs and strategy policy set (for a formal proof of convergence in
probabilistic models with homogeneous parties see Coughlin 1992). Formally,

Proposition 2 Parties

select

for an economy with party centralization and a single unit of

government such that

Define
assume
and

,

and

is a negative definite Hessian of
then

. Moreover, we
. For the case

is a global maximizer of

satisfies
in the constrained policy set.
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Lemma 1 Local public goods are Pareto efficient for an economy with a majoritarian electoral system,
single member districts, a single unit of government, a centralized party system, and for
. All parties converge in providing a uniform local public good across districts,
satisfying

Proof
See the appendix.

Lemma 1 says

is Pareto efficient for all

since a nationwide election

provides voting rights to residents of all districts and parties have electoral incentives to aggregate the
households’ benefits (the left hand side of 4) and the parties’ electoral costs (the right hand side of 4) from
the provision of the uniform local public good in all districts.

Local Governments and Party Centralization
In this section we consider an economy with party centralization in which local public goods are
provided by a system of local governments. Two parties compete in the local election of each district to
form the local government. In a federation with a centralized party system, the leaders of nationwide parties
face multiple electoral contests and nominate candidates who propose policies that maximize the party’s
joint probability of winning the elections in districts and – .6 As mentioned above, in a centralized party
system, party leaders have full command on policy making by nominating only those candidates who adopt
the ideal fiscal policy of party leaders. The winning party in each district takes all, forms the government,
6

In this paper we only consider the, empirically relevant, case in which parties have presence in all of the jurisdictions and we
ignore the case in which some parties have only a regional presence.
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and designs policy. Local public goods in each district are chosen by the government of the district and
expenditure is financed by a uniform tax on residents of the district.
The findings of this section are the following: First, in lemma 2 we show that party centralization in
a system of local governments leads to Pareto efficient local public goods with and without inter-regional
spillovers. Moreover, in a system of local governments public spending is differentiated to match the
heterogeneous preferences of voters across districts.
We also show that the provision of local public goods by a system of local governments is welfare
superior to the unitary provision of local public goods with and without spillovers if parties are centralized,
party leaders seek to maximize votes, the preferences over public goods are heterogeneous, and the unitary
provision does not show economies of scale.
To prove our claims, we define the joint probability of party z of winning the elections in districts
and – by

as a function of the pluralities of the party in both districts,

where

, and

,

is the proportion of votes that party

expects to receive in the local election of district , and
type

and

is the marginal probability that a voter

votes for the party in the district´s election.

Proposition 3 In the local election of district of an economy with party centralization, parties
select

and

such that

Define
satisfying

, and assume

is a negative definite Hessian of
is a global maximizer of

. For

in the constrained policy set.

On what follows, Lemma 2 characterizes the equilibrium spending policies for this economy and
Theorem 1 shows the main result of this section.
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Lemma 2 Party centralization in a system of local governments leads to a set of Pareto efficient local
public goods

for all

. At the political equilibrium,

satisfies the following:

Proof
See the appendix.

Lemma 2 says that in each jurisdiction, parties in district choose a policy that is equivalent to a
policy that maximizes an anonymous Utilitarian nationwide social welfare function subject to the constraint
that the local public good of the district is financed by the residents of the district (see the equivalence
between the results in 2 and 6 implying

) . As a result, the spending policies in a system of

local governments are Pareto efficient for local public goods with and without spillovers. Even though a
local election in district does not provide voting rights to voters of other jurisdictions, local public goods
are Pareto efficient because the political process is centralized and rational parties recognize that the interregional externalities of local public goods create an interdependence between the parties’ share of vote in
the local elections of districts and – . Thus, parties have electoral incentives to propose spending policies
that internalize the inter-regional spillovers to maximize the party’s joint probability of winning local
elections in districts and – .

Theorem 1 “Strong Decentralization Theorem”: The provision of local public goods with and without
inter-regional spillovers by a system of local governments welfare-dominates the centralized provision.
Proof
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See the appendix.

Theorem 1 says that the nationwide welfare of voters is higher under the provision of local public
goods with and without inter-regional spillovers by a system of local governments relative the nationwide
wellbeing derived by the provision of local public goods provided by the central government. This is a
stronger case for the decentralized provision of local public goods than the Decentralization Theorem in
which a system of local governments is welfare superior to a unitary provision only for the case in which
local public goods do not display inter-regional spillovers (see Oates 1972).
Note, first that, local public goods with and without inter-regional spillovers are Pareto efficient
under the provision of both a central government and a system of local governments. Second, local
elections induce parties to select the size of public spending that maximizes a unanimous utilitarian
nationwide social welfare without the constraint that local public goods must be uniform as it is the case of
the unitary provision in our economy. By matching the heterogeneous preferences of households for public
spending across districts, Pareto efficient local public goods with and without regional spillovers in a
federation exhausts the nationwide welfare benefits to be gained from policy differentiation. Since the
central government does not differentiate local public goods to local preferences then a system of local
governments is welfare superior to the unitary option of public spending.

Fiscal Federalism and Party Decentralization
In this section we extend our analysis of the provision of local public goods for a democracy with a
majoritarian electoral system, single member districts, and decentralized party systems. For a democracy
with party decentralization, a primary election takes place in which residents vote to nominate a candidate
while in the general election voters elect a public official. In this setting, our interest is to analyze how the
political institutions of primaries create incentives for parties to represent the interests of a broad set of
voters in the electorate versus the preferences of a minority coalition of voters in the provision of local
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public goods. In the latter case, the government seeks to target the benefits of the collective action in this
economy.
Proponents of decentralized party systems argue that primary elections promote the political
participation of voters and the representation of their interests in the policies implemented by the
government. However, the participation rules of primaries might actually limit both the voters’
participation in elections and their political influence on policy design.
Primary elections can be open, semi-closed, and closed (see Kaufman and Gimpel 2003). In open
primaries voters of any affiliation may vote for any party while in closed primaries only those voters
affiliated with a party (probably partisan voters) can vote in the party’s primary. In closed primaries
candidates have electoral incentives to weigh (discount) heavily the preferences over policy of those voters
who can (not) participate in the primary election. Hence, parties might have electoral incentives to
implement the ideal provision of local public goods of primary voters. This might be considered socially
undesirable because in this case public spending does not maximize the fiscal exchange associated with the
provision of local public goods for all residents of this economy but it maximizes the fiscal surplus from
public goods for a minority coalition of voters in the electorate (the primary voters).7
The main results of this section are: first, we show that local public goods without inter-regional
spillovers are Pareto efficient in decentralized political regimes for all types of primary elections and all
structures of government. In our economy, the participation rules of primaries do not affect the efficiency
but affect the distribution of gains across voters from public spending by modifying the political influence
of primary versus general election voters in determining the level of public spending.

7

The fiscal exchange of local public goods reflects the following tradeoff: on the one hand, an increase of public spending leads
to higher utility of voters (this is the marginal benefit). On the other hand, higher spending requires higher taxes and lower
consumption of private goods (this is the marginal cost). At low taxes, public spending is also low which implies that the
marginal benefit is likely to outweigh the marginal costs of increasing the provision of local public goods. This guarantees that at
the equilibrium, the fiscal exchange associated with the provision of local public goods entails a non-negative surplus. See, for
example, Martinez-Vazquez (1982).
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Second, we also show that the Decentralization Theorem holds for economies with majoritarian
electoral systems, single member districts, and decentralized party regimes with open primaries. However,
if the primaries are closed the decentralization Theorem, in general, does not hold.

Primary and General Elections in a Single Government and a System of Local Governments
Consider first the case in which parties compete for a single national government in a sequential
electoral contest. In the first stage of our model, two individuals, denoted by and

in each party seek the

nomination of their party by declaring their binding policy platforms over public spending, and all voters
observe the candidates’ policies but only qualified voters vote in the primary election. 8 In a closed primary
the right to vote is limited only to voters affiliated with the party, and in open primaries all voters (those
affiliated and not affiliated with some party) can vote to nominate a candidate. 9 The candidate who
receives the majority of the votes across all districts wins the nomination of his party.
In the second stage, the general election takes place and all voters in the electorate vote from the set
of nominated candidates to elect a public official. Voting is sincere at the different stages of the electoral
contest.10 The winner of the general election takes all, forms the government, and implements his policy
platform.
In the first stage of the game, candidates
to maximize the joint probability,

announce their fiscal platforms on public spending

, of winning the nationwide primary and general elections.

Candidates propose a policy platform that is sequentially rational and therefore their policy platform must
consider two different states that might be played in the second stage: the candidates might compete in the
general election against candidate 1 or 2 of party
8

.

The assumption that, in the first stage of the electoral contest, candidates announce a binding policy platform is for simplicity of
the analysis and it ignores dynamic inconsistency issues such as the possibility that candidates might announce different policies
in the primary and general election to please, respectively, primary and general election voters.
9
This assumption implies that if the primary is open then all voters in the economy vote in the primaries of parties and – ,
while if the primary is closed then only qualified voters vote in the primary of party or party – .
10
The assumption that voters vote sincerely also seeks to simplify the analysis and it ignores strategic voting behavior such as
credible threats of some coalition of voters who might abstain from voting for the nominated candidate in the general election if
the candidate changes the policy position he previously announced in the primary election.
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Define
that

, as the joint cumulative mass

wins both elections where

candidate

,

versus that of candidate

in the primary election, and

is the nationwide

runs against candidate 1   z in the general election. A

plurality for the state in which candidate
similar interpretation is given to

is the nationwide plurality of

.11

For each of the pluralities
that

and

it is satisfied
, where

proportion of the vote in the primary and
of candidate

for

is the nationwide expected
is the nationwide expected proportion of the vote

. The expected proportion of the vote of candidate in the primary of

district is

where

is the continuous marginal probability that a voter type

in district i votes for

is the joint probability that the voter type

in the primary, and

votes for

and the general election. Similarly, the corresponding proportion of the vote for
general election is
mass of

for

in district if he faces candidates

The joint probability

in district in the

is the marginal cumulative

in the general election.
is continuous and non-decreasing with

. Sincere voting implies that a voter type

in district i votes for

general election if

, and

in the nationwide primary and

,
,

11

where

in the primary

.

On what follows, and for convenience of our analysis, we will distinguish voters who participate in the primary election (from
voters who participate in the general election) with a tilde.
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for an economy with a single unit of government and

party decentralization such that

Define
Moreover, assume
and

,

and

.

is a negative definite Hessian of
, then

. For

satisfying

is a global maximizer of

in the

constrained policy set.

Proposition 5 The electoral equilibrium for our economy with party decentralization for all structures of
government is: all candidates of the same party select the same fiscal platform. However, if the primary
election is open the fiscal policies of parties z and –z converge and if the primary is closed the parties´
policies diverge.

Lemma 3 For economies with a decentralized party system and a central government representing voters
of all districts, a uniform and Pareto efficient local public good
it satisfies the following:

Where

. Moreover,

is provided such that
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is a weighted rate of substitution between marginal changes in the parties´ plurality in the primary and
the general election, and

Where

is a weighted covariance between the marginal probability of voting for party z in the

nationwide general election,
provision of the local public good

, and the change in the wellbeing of voters from an increase in the
.

Proof
See the appendix.

In this economy, the parties’ policies converge when the primary is open and diverge in sequential
elections with closed primaries. The intuition of this result is straightforward: in sequential elections with
open primaries parties share a common system of beliefs over the citizens’ voting behavior, there are no
restrictions on the voting rights for citizens (voters can vote in all primaries and the general election), the
policy strategy set is the same for both parties, and candidates are not otherwise differentiated. Moreover,
parties seek to maximize a function that is continuous and strictly concave in the constrained policy space.
In this case, parties converge in their fiscal policies by selecting the ideal policy of the average voter of the
general election.
However, if primaries are closed then parties propose a uniform policy that reflects a compromise
between the ideal policy of a weighted average voter of the primary and the ideal policy of a weighted
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average voter of the general election (see expression 8). In closed primaries, the voting rights are only
granted to affiliated voters and therefore the distribution of the ideal policies of primary voters is different
for each party. Since the distribution of ideal policies of primary and general election voters that parties
aggregate are different, the parties’ spending policies diverge.
Lemma 3 characterizes the first order condition for the problem of public spending design for
candidates in decentralized party systems. In this Lemma, the left hand side of (8) is a weighted average of
marginal indirect utility gains due to a marginal change in the public good for all voters participating in the
general election while the first term of the right hand side of (8) is the corresponding weighted marginal
indirect utility gain of primary voters. The expression

is a weighted rate of substitution between

marginal changes in the parties’ plurality in the primary and the general election. This term reflects the
parties’ incentives to weigh more (less) heavily the preferences over public spending of primary versus
general election voters. The higher
associated with a small increase in

the higher is the marginal plurality gain of the party in the primary
and the higher the electoral incentives for party to produce a

policy closer to the ideal policy of the weighted average primary voter.
Moreover,
the individual type

is a weighted covariance between the marginal probability of voting for party
,

for

, and the change in the well being of the voter from an increase in the

provision of the local public good

. Candidates will have electoral incentives to increase the size

of the uniform local public good when voters with higher than average marginal probabilities of voting for
the candidate have also higher than average values of

.

Party Decentralization and Local Elections
Now we proceed to characterize the provision of local public goods in a system of local
governments with party decentralization. A detailed description of the electoral game for an economy with
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party decentralization in a system of local governments is omitted to save space. However, the structure of
the game is easily extended from our previous discussion: a local primary and general election take place.
Candidates

in each party, and in each district, announce policy platforms that maximize the joint

probability of the candidate, say

of winning the primary and general elections in their district,

. Only qualified residents of the district vote in the local primary while all the residents
of the district can vote in the local general election. Voting is sincere in both elections. The local general
election takes place, the winner takes all, and implements his policy platform.

Proposition 6 In the local election of district of an economy with party decentralization, all candidates
of party select

We assume
then

such that

is a negative definite Hessian of
is a global maximizer of

. If

satisfies

in the constrained policy set.

On what follows, Lemma 4 provides a general characterization of local public goods for federations
with majoritarian systems, single member districts, and party decentralized regimes. Also on what follows,
Theorems 2 and 3 show that the decentralization theorem holds in open primaries and fails to hold in closed
primaries.

Lemma 4 For economies with party decentralization and a system of local governments representing
voters in each district, local public goods

Where

are provided such that

satisfies the following:
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is a weighted rate of substitution between marginal changes in the party’s plurality in the district’s primary
and the general local election, and

is a weighted covariance between the marginal probability that voter type
general election in district i,
provision of the local public good

votes for party z in the local

, and the change in the well being of voters from an increase in the
.

Proof
See the appendix.

The interpretation to this equilibrium is similar to that given in Lemma 3. In local elections, parties
provide a public good that reflects a compromise between the ideal spending policies of the district’s
weighted average voter of the primary and the district´s weighted average voter of the general election. The
parties´ incentives to weigh more (less) heavily the preferences over public spending of primary versus
general election voters in district are given by

and

. The higher

, the higher the electoral

incentives for party to produce a policy closer to the ideal policy of the weighted average primary voter in
district . Moreover, the expression,

, is a weighted covariance between the marginal probability of

voting for party in the general election of the district,
from an increase in the provision of the local public good,
higher the provision of the public good in the district.

, and the change in well being of voters
. For

, the higher

the
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Theorem 2 The Decentralization Theorem holds in Majoritarian democracies with a decentralized party
system, open primaries, and single member districts.
Proof
See the appendix

Theorem 2 shows that candidates running for local governments in a party decentralized system
with open primaries have incentives to propose the size of public spending that maximizes a unanimous
Utilitarian social welfare function of local residents in each jurisdiction. The resulting policies are Pareto
efficient for local public goods without spillovers. Moreover, public goods are matched according to the
heterogeneous preferences of voters across districts. In the case candidates compete to form a nationwide
government, local public goods with and without spillover are uniform and Pareto efficient, and the size of
the local public good reflects the ideal size on public spending from the nationwide average voter. Lastly, if
local public goods do not display regional spillovers then a system of local governments supplying local
public goods

in districts and

is welfare superior to a uniform provision

by a central

government. Consequently, the Decentralization Theorem holds for majoritarian democracies with
decentralized party regimes and open primaries.

Theorem 3 The Decentralization Theorem does not hold in Majoritarian democracies with single member
districts and decentralized party systems with closed primaries.
Proof
See the appendix
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In general, the Decentralization Theorem does not hold for a democracy with party decentralization
and closed primaries.12 To see this, consider the case in which minority coalitions (i.e. primary voters) have
strong political influence over local governments that is translated into local public goods that are closer to
their preferences. In this case, the electoral competition might produce extreme policy positions (too much
or too little local public spending) instead of moderate policies.
For instance, in condition (13) there are parametric values of

and

in which local elections

produce the size of public spending in the vicinity of the ideal policy of primary voters in each district (a
minority of the society) instead of the ideal policy of all residents in each district (the utilitarian measure of
social welfare). Simultaneously, we can find parametric values in the equilibrium of the election to form a
central government that averages the political influence of local coalitions to produce a more moderate
provision of local public goods that could be welfare superior to the less moderate provision of public
goods in the system of local governments. This is likely true for an economy with many localities in which
the political influence of local coalitions is significant over local governments but the influence of local
minority groups fades away in the nationwide election. Therefore, in this setting, the provision of a uniform
public good by a single government could be welfare superior to the set of differentiated but extreme
provision of local public goods in a system of local governments.13

Empirical Analysis
The key expectation stemming from our formal model is that the combination of democratic
decentralization and party centralization will lead to the best delivery of public goods, other things equal.
We test this hypothesis with a series of quantitative models of all electorally competitive countries from
1976 to 2007, contingent on data availability. Our most expansive model considers 2078 observations and
12

A comparison of (8) and (2) shows that the electorally optimal policy for Downsian candidates in a nationwide sequential
election with closed primaries are, in general, different to the size of public spending that maximizes the fiscal surplus from
public spending for all residents in the economy. A similar conclusion is reached for local elections in a federation (see
conditions 13 and 2). As a result, the Decentralization Theorem does not hold.
13
It is also simple to characterize conditions in which a system of local governments would produce public goods that are Pareto
superior to those provided by a single nationwide government.
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133 countries, to our knowledge the broadest examination of sub-national political institutions in the
literature.
We employ seven different measures of educational outcomes to operationalize our dependent
variable, the provision of public goods at the sub-national level. Educational outcome measures are often
used in the empirical literature to denote public goods provision at the sub-national level (see, for example,
Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya 2007 and Faguet and Sanchez 2008). Our specific measures come from
World Bank (2010) and include Primary School Completion Rate, Primary School Teachers as a
proportion of youth population, Children out of School as a proportion of youth population, Preprimary
Enrollment Rate, Primary Enrollment Rate, Secondary Enrollment Rate, and Tertiary Enrollment Rate. We
discuss how these seven measures are coded and provide some summary statistics in Table 1.
We select educational outcomes as our dependent variable because they allow us to examine both
allocative efficiency gains (i.e. differentiation based on local preference – the main hypothesized benefit of
democratic decentralization) and the degree to which public goods are provided in the face of spillovers
(the hypothesized benefit of centralized parties). Why should this be so? First, our indicators of
educational provision are subject to strong extra-jurisdictional spillover effects. All inhabitants of a
country benefit from the educational attainment of their fellow citizens — in general, greater knowledge
accumulation leads to reduced crime and economic improvements that spill outside the limits of any single
jurisdiction. Another source of spillover effects occurs with population mobility – local residents may move
outside a jurisdiction after receiving their education, and residents of neighboring jurisdictions may
sometimes register for schools (especially tertiary schools) not provided in their own locales. For these
reasons, the provision of education, as measured by our indicators, can be associated with a greater
willingness on the part of local leaders to provide public goods in the presence of spillovers.
Our educational indicators also capture allocative efficiency effects for at least two reasons. First,
improved political accountability resulting from democratic decentralization provides decentralized
governments greater incentives to act in accordance with the needs and preferences of their constituents.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics – The Dependent Variable (Differenced and Lagged)
Variable
Primary School
Completion Rate
(Differenced)
Children Out of School
(Differenced)
Primary School Teachers
(Differenced)
Preprimary School
Enrollment (Differenced)
Primary School Enrollment
(Differenced)
Secondary School
Enrollment (Differenced)
Tertiary School Enrollment
(Differenced)
Primary School
Completion Rate (Lagged)
Children Out of School
(Lagged)
Primary School Teachers
(Lagged)
Preprimary School
Enrollment (Lagged)
Primary School Enrollment
(Lagged)
Secondary School
Enrollment (Lagged)
Tertiary School Enrollment
(Lagged)

Computation Method and Source
The differenced ratio of total primary school graduates to
the total population of the relevant age. (Source: World
Bank)
The differenced ratio of primary aged children not
enrolled in school to the total population under age 14.
(Source: World Bank)
The differenced ratio of primary school teachers to the
total population under age 14. (Source: World Bank)
The differenced ratio of total enrollment in preprimary
school, regardless of age, to the total population of
preprimary school age. (Source: World Bank)
The differenced ratio of total enrollment in primary
school, regardless of age, to the total population of
primary school age. (Source: World Bank)
The differenced ratio of total enrollment in secondary
school, regardless of age, to the total population of
secondary school age. (Source: World Bank)
The differenced ratio of total enrollment in tertiary
school, regardless of age, to the total population of
tertiary school age. (Source: World Bank)
The lagged ratio of total primary school graduates to the
total population of relevant age. (Source: World Bank)
The lagged ratio of primary aged children not enrolled in
school to the total population under age 14. (Source:
World Bank)
The lagged ratio of primary school teachers to the total
population under age 14. (Source: World Bank)
The lagged ratio of total enrollment in preprimary school,
regardless of age to the total population of preprimary
school age. (Source: World Bank)
The lagged ratio of total enrollment in primary school,
regardless of age, to the total population of primary
school age. (Source: World Bank)
The lagged ratio of total enrollment in secondary school,
regardless of age, to the total population of secondary
school age. (Source: World Bank)
The lagged ratio of total enrollment in tertiary school,
regardless of age, to the total population of tertiary school
age. (Source: World Bank)

Mean

Range

Expectations

.873

-34.19 to
46.19

Dependent
Variable

-.220

-9.44 to
4.88

Dependent
Variable

.027

-.776 to
.614

Dependent
Variable

1.27

-45.5 to
46.2

Dependent
Variable

.618

-27.0 to
28.7

Dependent
Variable

1.01

-51.8 to
38.2

Dependent
Variable

1.21

-11.8 to
26.2

Dependent
Variable

80.7

0 to
125

Negative

4.57

0 to 30.1

Negative

1.57

.110 to
4.34

Negative

48.5

.129 to
122

Negative

98.7

16.8 to
159

Negative

70.1

2.40 to
162

Negative

26.8

.108 to
98.0

Negative

While most constituencies will prize superior educational outcomes, different sorts of practices are likely to
produce these outcomes in different locales. For example, in one constituency, limited resources might
best be channeled into increasing the number of teachers, whereas in another improved educational
materials might be a focus. As a result, we believe that superior educational provision likely reflects (other
things equal) an ability on the part of officials to consider local preferences and conditions.
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Second, two recent papers (Faguet and Sanchez 2005 and Solé-Ollé and Esteller-Moré 2005)
conclude that decentralization leads to better adjustment between investment patterns and local demands (in
Bolivian municipalities in the first instance and Spanish provinces in the second). Similarly, in a more
recent paper, Arze del Granado, Martinez-Vazquez, and McNab (2012) analyze the effects of
decentralization on the composition of public expenditures for a large panel of countries and conclude that
decentralization of public goods delivery is usually accompanied by an increase in educational
expenditures. This finding asserts that decentralization, via greater responsiveness of public officials and
preference matching, can increase allocative efficiency by altering the composition of public expenditures.
On the right side of the equation, our theory requires that we consider both the existence of elected
sub-national governments and the level of party decentralization at the sub-national level. We develop an
original dataset of sub-national political institutions to capture both of these measures, which we code for
all countries between 1975 and 2010, where data are available. As part of this dataset, we code for the
presence of elections, the structure of legislative-executive relations, the electoral system, the extent to
which the national party system is replicated, and the centralization of parties at both the highest subnational level and the municipal level (defined as the lowest level of sub-national government).14
To operationalize party centralization, we make use of an indicator first developed by Carey and
Shugart (1995) and labeled the “Ballot” variable. This variable measures what is perhaps the most
significant power that national party leaders can wield – the power to nominate candidates for office. The
ballot variable is coded “0” when national party leaders have full nomination powers, “1” when they
nominate a list but voters have the power to change its order (as in open list or alternate vote systems), and
“2” when they have little power over nomination (as in primary systems or systems where candidates get
on the ballot by collecting signatures or paying a fee). Carey and Shugart coded their variable for a small
number of representative cases, and Hankla (2006) later added all democracies from 1975 to 2004. We
The dataset, along with a source list, is available upon request. Note that another comprehensive dataset of sub-national
indicators has recently been produced by Ivanyna and Shah (2012), but their focus is not on the specific political institutions that
we code.
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expand these datasets by capturing not just the power of national party leaders to nominate candidates for
the national legislature, but also whether these national party leaders can nominate candidates to regional
and local assemblies.
Yet, simply coding party centralization is not enough to measure the power of national party leaders
over sub-national and municipal elections. We also need to know whether national parties are competing
and winning in these elections. If only 10% of a municipal council’s seats are held by national parties, or
if, for example, 50% of its seats are chosen in non-partisan elections, national party influence cannot be
significant even if parties are centralized as defined above.
Drawing on these considerations, we create one key independent variable from our dataset to
include in the model—a dummy variable, labeled Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization,
coded “1” when (1) there are municipal elections, and (2) more than 75% of municipal council seats are
held by national parties, and (3) national party leaders exercise centralized power over municipal party
nomination (i.e. party centralization is coded “0” above).15 To our knowledge, this article is the first to
consider party system nationalization and party centralization simultaneously in a large empirical model.
Additionally, we control for potentially confounding political factors by including two additional
variables, also coded as part of our original dataset. The first of these is Municipal Plurality, coded “1”
when municipal council elections are held using a plurality (as opposed to a proportional or mixed)
electoral system. The second is Municipal Directly Elected Executive, coded “1” when municipal
executives are directly elected and not removable (except through impeachment or election recall) by the
municipal councils. While there is little research on the impact of these institutions at the municipal level,
previous research on electoral and executive institutions at the national level indicates that they may matter

15

Note that the extent of local party system nationalization can vary by municipality within individual countries, and that party
centralization can vary by party within individual countries. There tends, all the same, to be a great deal of commonality in party
system nationalization and party structure within a country, allowing for relatively straightforward coding in most cases. That
said, when we encountered mixed cases, we went with what appeared to be the most common institutional structure in the
country. Those country-years coded “1” on the primary dummy variable are listed in Table 3, and we are very open to feedback
by country experts on the accuracy of the coding.
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for public goods outcomes.16 For example, there is reason to believe that strong unitary executives (elected
and subject to reasonable legislative oversight) may produce better public outcomes than dominant
legislatures (see, for example, Mukherjee 2003; Egger, Koethenbuerger, and Smart 2010; Sabatini 2003).
And, although this finding is still quite contested, proportional electoral systems may have certain benefits
over simple plurality systems (see, for example, Lijphart 1977). For all three political variables, of course,
democratically centralized systems are among those coded “0”.
We include in the model a series of economic and social control variables, namely GDP per capita
in purchasing power parity, fertility rate, population density, urban population, world region dummies, and
expenditure and revenue decentralization. Countries with a higher GDP per capita can be expected to have
more resources to pour into education. Likewise, countries with lower fertility rates will tend to have more
resources to devote to each child. Higher levels of population density and urban population should also be
associated with better educational outcomes, as they facilitate access to teachers and school resources. And
greater fiscal decentralization, both on the expenditure and revenue sides, should empower local
governments to take a greater role in education service delivery.
In addition to these variables, we include dummies for world regions in all of the models to control
for cultural or geographically specific effects. And as our theoretical model assumes elections, we also
restrict our models to countries that are minimally electorally competitive using the Legislative Index of
Electoral Competitiveness from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). This index ranges
from one to seven, and we only include country-years coded at least a six, indicating that more than one
party holds seats in the national legislature. We choose this more expansive definition of electoral
competition in preference to a measure of democracy (such as Polity) in order to maximize our
observations and because we believe that electoral competition but not necessary full-fledged democracy
must be present to observe our theorized effects.

16

For a summary of this literature as it relates to local political institutions, see Hankla and Downs (2010).
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Table 2: Summary Statistics – The Independent Variables
Variable
Democratic
Decentralization, Party
Centralization (Lagged)
Municipal Plurality
Municipal Directly Elected
Executive
Fertility (Differenced)
Fertility (Lagged)
Logged GDP per capita
(Differenced)
Logged GDP per capita
(Lagged)
Logged Population Density
(Differenced)
Logged Population Density
(Lagged)
Urban Population
(Differenced)
Urban Population (Lagged)
Expenditure
Decentralization
(Differenced)
Expenditure
Decentralization (Lagged)
Revenue Decentralization
(Differenced)
Revenue Decentralization
(Lagged)
Regional Dummies

Legislative Electoral
Competitiveness (Lagged)

Computation Method and Source
Coded “1” when (1) there are municipal elections,
and (2) more than 75% of municipal council seats
are held by national parties, and (3) national party
leaders control party nomination in municipal
elections. (Source: Original Dataset)
Coded “1” when (1) there are municipal elections,
and (2) a plurality system is used to elect the
municipal assembly. (Source: Original Dataset)
Coded “1” when (1) there are municipal elections,
and (2) the municipal mayor or other executive is
directly elected and cannot be removed by the
municipal council. (Source: Original Dataset)
Differenced average births per woman
(Source: World Bank)
Lagged average births per woman
(Source: World Bank)
Differenced Logged GDP per capita ppp
(Source: World Bank)
Lagged Logged GDP per capita ppp
(Source: World Bank)
Differenced logged people per square kilometer
(Source: World Bank)
Lagged logged people per square kilometer
(Source: World Bank)
Differenced urban population as a percent of total
(Source: World Bank)
Lagged urban population as a percent of total
(Source: World Bank)
Differenced Percentage of Government
Expenditures Undertaken at the Sub-National
Level (Source: IMF)
Lagged Percentage of Government Expenditures
Undertaken at the Sub-National Level (Source:
IMF)
Differenced Percentage of Government Revenues
Collected at the Sub-National Level (Source: IMF)
Lagged Percentage of Government Revenues
Collected at the Sub-National Level (Source:
IMF)
Dummy variables for seven world regions, with
Sub-Saharan Africa as the reference category
Lagged Legislative Index of Electoral
Competitiveness (Source: Database of Political
Institutions)

Expected Impact on
Public Goods
Positive
(negatively related to
Children Out of
School, positively
related to all other Y)

Mean

Range

.505

Dummy

.262

Dummy

Uncertain
(Negative?)

.391

Dummy

Uncertain
(Positive?)

-.053
3.24
.021
8.54
.014
4.01
.340
53.5

-.340 to
.335
1.08 to
7.74
-.703 to
.599
5.61 to
10.8
-.038 to
.124
.367 to
8.76
-.480 to
3.04
7.02 to
100

Negative
Negative
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive

.0008

-.210 to
.196

Uncertain
(Positive?)

.251

.016 to
.605

Uncertain
(Positive?)

.0009

-.224 to
.208

Uncertain
(Positive?)

.255

.008 to
.617

Uncertain
(Positive?)

N/A

N/A

N/A

1 to 7

Used to restrict
dataset to countries
with multiple parties
in the national
legislature (scoring 6
or 7)

N/A

Table 3: Countries Coded “1” on Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization
(Note: Only electorally competitive country-years included; coded “1” for 1975-2006 unless otherwise stated)
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Albania (1992-2006), Argentina (1975, 1984-1990), Austria, Azerbaijan (2000-2006), Benin (2002-2006), Bolivia
(1987-2006), Bosnia (2003-2006), Botswana, Bulgaria (1991-2006), Burkina Faso (1995-2006), Burundi (20052006), Cambodia (2002-2006), Colombia (1975-1990), Costa Rica, Croatia (1993-2006), Cyprus, Denmark,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador (1980-96), Egypt (1996-2006), El Salvador (1983-2006), Equatorial Guinea (19952006), Estonia (1993-2006), Fiji (1975-1997), Finland, France, Gabon (1997-2006), Gambia (1975-1994, 20022006), Georgia (1993-2006), Greece, Guatemala (1995-2006), Guinea (2005-2006), Guyana (1994-2006), Haiti
(1991, 1995-2006), Honduras (1992-2006), Indonesia (2005-2006), Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast (2001-2006), Jamaica,
Japan, Kazakhstan (1997-2006), South Korea (1991-2006), Kirgizia (1996-1998), Latvia (1994-2006), Lebanon
(1998-2006), Liberia (1986-1989), Lithuania (1995-2006), Macedonia (1996-2006), Madagascar (1995-2006),
Malawi (2000-2005), Mali (1993-2006), Mauritania (1992-2005), Mexico, Moldova (1995-2006), Moldova (19952006), Mongolia (2001-2006), Morocco (1992-2006), Mozambique (1998-2006), Namibia (1992-2006), Nepal
(1992-2001), Nicaragua (1990-2006), Niger (2004-2006), Panama (1985-2006), Paraguay (1991-2006), Peru
(1981-2006), Portugal (1977-2006), Romania (1992-2006), Russia (2000-2006), Senegal (1996-2006), Sierra Leone
(2004-2006), Slovak Republic (1993-2006), Slovenia (1994-2006), Spain (1979-2006), Sri Lanka (1975-1986),
Sweden, Taiwan (1994-2006), Tajikistan (2000-2006), Tanzania (1996-2006), Thailand (1976, 1980-2006),
Trinidad, Tunisia (1995-2006), Ukraine (1998-2006), United Kingdom, Uzbekistan (2000-2006), Venezuela, Yemen
(2001-2006), Yugoslavia (1993-2001), Zambia (1992-2006), Zimbabwe (1984-2006)

We do not control for factors, such as teacher pay, that are related directly to educational outcomes,
as these are potentially part of the causal mechanism connecting political institutions with educational
outcomes. The data for GDP per capita, fertility rate, urban population, and population density are from
World Bank (2010), and the fiscal decentralization indicators are from International Monetary Fund (2004).
Summary statistics on all of our variables are presented in Table 2, and a complete listing of all countryyears coded “1” on our primary Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization variable is presented in
Table 3.
For our empirical analyses, we estimate error correction models with random effects and regional
dummies.17 Granger causality tests show that no endogeneity exists in the models, so an instrumental
variable approach is not necessary in this context. However, Dickey-Fuller tests show that our dependent
variables are non-stationary in many of our country cases. It is this fact that motivates the use of error
correction models for our analysis, as the differenced dependent variable corrects for the unit root problem.
In addition, an error correction framework has the benefit of allowing us to separate the short-term from the
long-term effects of our independent variables. Each independent variable is included in the model in both
differenced and lagged form, with the differenced variables measuring short-term effects and the lagged

17

For more on error correction models, see Baltagi 2000.
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variables measuring long-term effects. We do not difference our primary independent variables as they
change only slowly across time, and so differencing would produce a large number of zeros.
For our primary models, we select a random effects framework. While a Hausman test shows that
we cannot reject fixed country effects in our models, the low level of cross-temporal variable in our
primary independent variables means that a fixed effects model will wash out our most interesting
variation. By contrast, our random effects models allow us to deal with panel effects in a way that does not
eliminate cross-country variation. For robustness, we also run our primary models with a pooled OLS
estimator and country-clustered standard errors, as OLS coefficients have been shown to be quite robust in
a variety of settings (see Beck and Katz 1995). For reasons of space we do not present these results, but we
discuss them in the next section.
As a robustness test, we re-estimate each of our seven models after restricting the dependent
variables to within two standard deviations in each direction from their means. We do this to ensure that
our results are not dependent on the somewhat large outliers to be found in the differenced dependent
variables. We make use of robust standard errors in each of our models, and we include a lagged
dependent variable, as is customary in error correction models. We present the results of our seven primary
models in Table 4, of those same models without outliers in Table 5, and of the models with fiscal
decentralization controls in Table 6.
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Table 4: Results of the Primary Models
(Error Correction Models with Random Effects, Robust Standard Errors, and Regional Dummies)
Variable

Model 1
Y= Diff.
Primary
Completion
Rate
(N=1290,
120
countries)

Model 2
Y= Diff.
Primary
School
Teachers
(N=1523,
130
countries)

Model 3
Y= Diff.
Preprimary
Enrollment
Rate
(N=1795,
125
countries)

Model 4
Y= Diff.
Primary
Enrollment
Rate
(N=2078,
133
countries)

Model 5
Y= Diff.
Secondary
Enrollment
Rate
(N=1808,
130
countries)

Model 6
Y= Diff.
Tertiary
Enrollment
Rate
(N=1612,
127
countries)

Model 7
Y= Diff.
Children
Out of
School
(N=1293,
117
countries)

Lagged Dependent
Variable
Democratic
Decentralization,
Party Centralization
(Lagged)
Municipal Plurality
(Lagged)
Municipal Directly
Elected Executive
(Lagged)
Fertility
(Differenced)

-0.078***
(0.019)

-.006
(.007)

-.024***
(.007)

-.065
(.014)

-.035
(.008)

.001
(.006)

-0.083***
(0.022)

0.452**
(0.225)

.008*
(.005)

.376*
(.226)

.427
(.364)

.358**
(.152)

.102
(.151)

-0.177
(0.163)

-0.028
(0.313)

-.004
(.005)

-.019
(.295)

-.161
(.470)

-.319*
(.172)

.051
(.216)

0.150
(0.100)

-0.086
(0.240)

.009
(.006)

.100
(.222)

.289
(.374)

-.146
(.169)

.421***
(.151)

-0.035
(0.128)

-3.08
(2.20)
-0.649**
(0.285)
1.951
(2.10)
-0.097
(0.225)

-.051
(.039)
-.002
(.003)
.085*
(.049)
.001
(.004)

3.00
(1.88)
-.457***
(.154)
5.65**
(2.27)
.303
(.219)

-.564
(1.99)
-.688***
(.234)
2.46
(2.32)
-.798**
(.341)

-1.75
(2.20)
-.665***
(.158)
-.859
(2.11)
.041
(.136)

.801
(1.21)
-.197*
(.110)
4.11**
(1.69)
.197
(.177)

-0.019
(0.574)
0.183**
(0.086)
-1.07
(0.888)
0.107
(0.139)

5.53
(21.2)

.054
(.341)

18.1
(17.4)

46.9*
(25.1)

11.7
(15.0)

.405
(15.5)

-17.0*
(9.70)

-0.065
(0.100)
-0.058
(0.439)
0.007
(0.011)
.079

-.001
(.001)
.008
(.006)
-.00003
(.0002)
.020

.035
(.092)
.310
(.305)
.0005
(.009)
.037

.241
(.151)
-.076
(.313)
-.006
(.014)
.111

-.070
(.063)
.137
(.197)
.005
(.007)
.045

-.118**
(.056)
-.267*
(.138)
.007
(.007)
.129

-0.057
(0.042)
0.119
(0.117)
0.004
(0.007)
.141

Fertility (Lagged)
Logged GDP per
capita (Differenced)
Logged GDP per
capita (Lagged)
Logged Population
Density
(Differenced)
Logged Population
Density (Lagged)
Urban Population
(Differenced)
Urban Population
(Lagged)
R²

***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. All tests are 2-tailed. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis
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Table 5: Results of the Primary Models with Outliers Eliminated
(Error Correction Models with random effects, robust standard errors, and regional dummies, and with the dependent
variable limited to two standard deviations from its mean.)
Variable

Model 8
Y= Diff.
Primary
Completion
Rate
(N=1232,
120
countries)

Model 9
Y= Diff.
Primary
School
Teachers
(N=1450,
130
countries)

Model 10

Model 11

Model 12

Model 13

Lagged Dependent
Variable
Democratic
Decentralization,
Party Centralization
(Lagged)
Municipal Plurality
(Lagged)

-.053***
(.010)

Y= Diff.
Preprimary
Enrollment
Rate
(N=1721, 124
countries)

Y= Diff.
Primary
Enrollment
Rate
(N=1981, 131
countries)

Y= Diff.
Secondary
Enrollment
Rate
(N=1743, 130
countries)

Y= Diff.
Tertiary
Enrollment
Rate
(N=1538, 126
countries)

-.010***
(.006)

-.008*
(.004)

-.028***
(.006)

-.015***
(.005)

.008**
(.003)

-.044***
(.011)

.450**
(.203)

.007**
(.004)

.325*
(.175)

.313
(.220)

.313**
(.141)

.016
(.103)

-.099
(.074)

.010
(.237)

-.002
(.005)

-.231
(.223)

-.053
(.252)

-.221
(.156)

-.010
(.136)

.012
(.052)

Municipal Directly
Elected Executive
(Lagged)

-.057
(.191)

.006
(.004)

.081
(.204)

.275
(.205)

-.023
(.169)

.257**
(.114)

-.078
(.068)

Fertility
(Differenced)

-2.12
(1.86)
-.220
(.173)
.412
(1.90)
-.036
(.189)
-3.48
(19.4)
.010
(.067)
-.005
(.345)
.006
(.009)
.085

-.044
(.028)
-.005*
(.003)
.055
(.033)
.003
(.005)
.126
(.258)
.001
(.002)
.001
(.005)
-.0001
(.0002)
.020

2.13*
(1.18)
-.134
(.121)
4.30**
(1.77)
.159
(.169)
6.16
(13.3)
-.106
(.081)
.577**
(.265)
.003
(.006)
.071

-.006
(1.21)
-.123
(.128)
2.02
(1.31)
-.511***
(.168)
12.7
(12.1)
-.008
(.077)
-.168
(.223)
.002
(.007)
.111

-1.96
(1.47)
-.474***
(.127)
.330
(1.65)
-.082
(.140)
5.71
(12.0)
-.084
(.055)
.120
(.181)
-.001
(.005)
.051

.327
(1.05)
-.195**
(.094)
2.67**
(1.28)
.091
(.120)
-1.77
(11.2)
-.089*
(.046)
-.127
(.112)
.001
(.003)
.182

-.465
(.360)
.063
(.047)
-.118
(.366)
.050
(.050)
-5.97**
(2.78)
.016
(.019)
-.022
(.043)
.002
(.003)
.117

Fertility (Lagged)
Logged GDP per
capita (Differenced)
Logged GDP per
capita (Lagged)
Logged Population
Density (Differenced)
Logged Population
Density (Lagged)
Urban Population
(Differenced)
Urban Population
(Lagged)
R²

Model 14
Y= Diff.
Children
Out of
School
(N=1228,
113
countries)

***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. All tests are 2-tailed. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis

Results
The quantitative results provide strong support for our hypothesis. Beginning with the primary
models in Table 4, the Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization variable is significant in four of
the seven models and in the expected direction but not significant in the other three. Note that we have
estimated models with all of the theoretically relevant education variables that are available for a wide
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swath of countries and found in World Bank (2010). Note also that the various models differ significantly
in the number of N’s included, the specific observations, and in the nature of the dependent variable. For
these reasons, the consistency of the results across the seven models is quite striking and indicates that
countries enjoying both democratic decentralization and party centralization tend to produce better
educational outcomes. Moreover, when the models are rerun using pooled OLS and country-clustered
standard errors, the primary results are largely unchanged. The only significant difference that arises with
the new estimator is that the Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization variable comes closer to
statistical significance in the Children Out of School Model (p=.114). And the size of these predicted
effects is also worthy of consideration. Model 1, for instance, estimates that the combination of democratic
decentralization and party centralization causes an increase in differenced primary school enrollment of
nearly half a percent, or a little more than one-tenth of a standard deviation.
Table 5 presents the results of the primary models with their outliers dropped, i.e. restricted only to
observations where the dependent variable is within two standard deviations above or below its mean. The
results of the primary independent variable hold fully, and the variable’s statistical significance is in fact
strengthened in the Primary School Teachers model.18 Indeed, of the seven dependent variables considered
in our models, it is only in one case – Primary Enrollment Rate – that our primary independent variable
never achieves or comes close to achieving statistical significance. Why might that be the case? We

18

In Table 6, located in our online appendix for space reasons, we also present models with the expenditure and revenue
decentralization variable included. We estimate these models separately because the fiscal decentralization variables are missing
for many observations and severely restrict our N’s. Here again, the Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization variable
is in the expected direction in all models, but it retains significance in two of the seven (including, for the first time, Tertiary
Enrollment Rate). In our judgment, the fact that the primary variable remains significant in two of the models and is always in
the expected direction, despite the greatly restricted sample size, represents at least moderately strong confirmatory evidence for
our argument. The most striking finding related to the fiscal decentralization variables is that the impact of expenditure
decentralization on educational provision tends to be negative (especially in the short-run), while the impact of revenue
decentralization tends to be positive. Perhaps this is an indication that the devolution of expenditure powers without the ability to
raise money independently does not produce the expected gains; under these conditions, local governments struggle in the short
run to develop the capacity to manage devolved funds. The presence in only one model of a negative long-term relationship
between expenditure decentralization and educational outcomes is evidence that these problems often are eventually resolved.
On the other hand, the ability of local governments to raise revenue is perhaps a better measure of their genuine independence
and responsibility, and therefore more associated with a more accountable public goods provision. Indeed, a number of scholars
have argued that the hypothesized benefits of decentralization only accrue when sub-national governments have the power to
raise their own revenues (see, for example, Weingast (2009) and Rodden (2003).
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suspect that the greater (although far from perfect) universality of primary education means that political
factors such as the ones we consider will impact its provision less dramatically that the provision of, say,
preprimary or secondary education.
Which control variables matter for educational outcomes? Perhaps the most interesting findings are
that (1) municipalities with plurality electoral systems tend to see weaker improvements in the provision of
educational public goods, while (2) municipalities with directly elected executives (mayors) tend to see
stronger improvements.19 These relationships do not appear in all of the models, but they are common
enough to suggest some support for the prior literature on the benefits of direct election and electoral
proportionality.
In evaluating the economic and social control variables, it is important to remember that the lagged
variables represent long-term effects on the change in the dependent variable while the differenced
variables represent short term effects. Turning to the Fertility variables, higher levels of fertility are
associated with a long-term trend toward lower educational provision, as expected. The short-term impact
of Fertility is much less in evidence, which stands to reason given the time that it takes shifts in fertility to
impact educational demand. The results also indicate that increases in differenced GDP per capita are
associated with improvements in education. It is worth noting, however, that the lagged (long-term)
measure of GDP per capita is associated in several models with weaker improvement in public goods
provision. This combination of results likely indicates that short-term improvements in economic growth
will translate into improved educational outcomes, but that, over the long term, rich countries will stop
seeing educational improvements after they have achieved a certain level. In other words, poor but
growing economies can expect more dramatic educational improvements than rich but stagnant ones. It is
also worth noting that the only model where long-term high GDP per capita improves outcomes is the
Tertiary Enrollment Rate. This finding is not surprising, given that countries are less likely to achieve full

19

Note that a negative sign in the Children Out of School models indicates a better public goods outcome. Note also that the
negative effect of plurality elections is most apparent in the models in Table 6, found in the appendix.
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enrollment in tertiary education after a certain level of development than they are in primary or secondary
education.
There is evidence of the short-term benefits of higher Population Density on improving educational
outcomes, as expected. This effect is enhanced because increases in population are likely translate (albeit
indirectly) into a larger denominator for some of the dependent variables. In the long-run, however, high
Population Density seems to have a negative impact on tertiary enrollment. This result could be because
countries that are already quite dense experience weaker improvements in tertiary education. The shortterm impact of Urban Population is surprising, where it shows up in one Preprimary Enrollment model as
positive, and in one Tertiary Enrollment Rate model as negative. This result may indicate that more
increasingly urbanized societies are more likely to provide the somewhat unusual service of preschool
education, but this growth in urbanization can also indicate economic and social weaknesses that may
inhibit other forms of educational provision. But in the final analysis, differenced Urban Population is not
significant in enough models to draw a clear conclusion.
What can we say to summarize the results? The benefits of combining democratic decentralization
with party centralization are well borne out in our empirical analysis. The Democratic Decentralization,
Party Centralization variable is statistically significant in eight of the fourteen models, and it is always in
the expected direction. Its lack of significance in some of the models may give pause in making final
judgments. That said, the indicator shows up as significant across models using two different estimators, it
is able to explain at least five very different measures of educational attainment, and it is robust to vastly
different combinations of country-years. Given the difficulty of measuring educational outcomes,
particularly in the developing world, and given the complexity and specificity of local politics in different
countries, the robustness of the results provided here are notable. That said, our theory and others that draw
general lessons from sub-national political institutions will continue to require refinement in the light of
ongoing empirical tests.
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Conclusion
In this paper, we examine which types of political institutions may be necessary to deliver the gains from
decentralization predicted by much of the literature. We begin by developing a formal extension and
refinement of the decentralization theorem of Oates (1972), which has provided the basis for much past
research. Assuming inter-jurisdiction spillovers (something Oates did not do), we develop a “strong
decentralization theorem” which indicates the potential superiority of sub-national governance even in the
presence of externalities. An important implication of our theoretical model is that the combination of
democratic decentralization and party centralization tends to produce the most efficient provision of public
goods. Democratic decentralization ensures that local governments are responsive to the desires of their
constituents, while party centralization incentivizes local leaders to pay for goods that may have spillover
benefits.
To test our argument empirically, we create a large dataset on sub-national political institutions and
use it to estimate a series of cross-national empirical analysis of educational outcomes.

Our dataset is, to

our knowledge, the first to compile measures of sub-national political institutions across a large set of
countries. Our empirical findings provide strong support for our hypotheses. They show that the
combination of municipal elections and party centralization tends to improve educational outcomes.
Our ultimate goal in this paper is to understand better how the growing influence of sub-national
fiscal decentralization may impact the everyday lives of citizens around the world depending on the
arrangements used for political decentralization. There is much additional research to be done, not least in
refining our theory on the role of decentralized political institutions and applying it to new policy areas.
This paper also shows the potential of merging political science and economics into broader approaches to
explore the inter-connected dynamics of decentralized governance.
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Appendix
Lemma 1 Local public goods are Pareto efficient for an economy with a majoritarian electoral system,
single member districts, a single unit of government, a centralized party system, and for
. All parties converge in providing a uniform local public good across districts,
satisfying

Proof
The parties’ problem is
restriction

in

the

subject to
objective

function

of

. We impose the equality

party

.

The

first

order

.The

parties’

conditions

policies

is

converge,

, in probabilistic voting models with homogeneous parties (see Coughlin 1992) hence
.

Therefore

the

first

. Use

order

condition

becomes

and

to show that the uniform local public good

satisfies

Lemma 2 Party centralization in a system of local governments leads to a set of Pareto efficient local
public goods

for all

. At the political equilibrium,

satisfies the following:

Proof
In the local election of district

party

selects

condition for an interior maximizer with

is

. The first order
. By definition
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and the sum of the expected proportion of the votes for parties
therefore

for

and – is 1, that is,

. Then

and

. The convergence of the parties’ policies
implies

. Define

therefore

is equivalent to

Theorem 1 The provision of local public goods with and without inter-regional spillovers by a system of
local governments welfare-dominates the centralized provision.
Proof
It is simple to verify that conditions (2), (4) and (6) imply
and

.

for
By

the

on the constrained policy space
and

strict

concavity

of

feasible
such that

. Note
NSW

which

implies

>

NSW

. We

where

and

take

1

⟶0

to show

Without of loss of generality, set
and

is some feasible

are global maximizers of

then it is satisfied that
. Therefore conditions (2), (4) and (6) mean

and

and hence

.
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Lemma 3 For economies with a decentralized party system and a nationwide single government
representing voters of all districts, a uniform and Pareto efficient local public good

is

provided such that it satisfies the following:

Where

. Moreover,

is a weighted rate of substitution between marginal changes in the parties´ plurality in the primary and
the general election, and

Where

is a weighted covariance between the marginal probability of voting for party z in the

nationwide general election,
of the local public good

, and the change in well being of voters from an increase in the provision

.

Proof
For an economy with party decentralization and a nationwide government, party

designs public

spending to maximize
subject to
. We impose the equality restriction in
the objective function of party . The first order condition for the party’s problem is

By definition

,

for

The sum of the expected votes for parties and

– in both the primary and the general election is one then

, and

. Since
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then

and

for

. It follows that the first order condition is given by

From the definition of the covariance between
and

for

Define

and

Define

where

And

And

and

,

. Re-define

to find:

and use (26) into (25) to show
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Use (28), (29), and (30) into (27) to obtain the expression in (20)20

Lemma 4 For economies with party decentralization and a system of local governments representing
voters of each district, local public goods
are provided such that
satisfies the following:

Where

is a weighted rate of substitution between marginal changes in the party´s plurality in the district´s
primary and the general local election, and

is a weighted covariance between the marginal probability that voter type
general election in district i,
provision of the local public good

votes for party z in the local

, and the change in the well being of voters from an increase in the
.

Proof
In a federation with party decentralization, the spending policy of party z in district
.21 The first order condition of the party´s problem is

20
21

Equivalent to expression (16) of Lemma 3 in the paper.
Since the policies of candidates
and
converge, we re-define

.

is
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From definition,

and

for

. Obtain

, and re-arrange terms to re-express (35) as follows

From the definition of the covariance between
and

Where

for

and

,

. Re-define

to express the following

is the covariance between

and the voter´s marginal well being,

, due to a change in the provision of the local public good in district . Use conditions
and
establish

Define

And

To express condition (38) as follows

and substitute (37) into (36) to
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Theorem 2 The Decentralization Theorem holds in Majoritarian democracies with a decentralized party
system, open primaries, and single member districts.
Proof
For the economy with party decentralization and a system of local governments, the politically optimal
policy for party in each district is

satisfying:

Under open primaries, the distribution of preferences over policy of voters voting in the primary is the
same as the distribution of preferences of voters voting in the general election. Therefore,
and

. In this case, the parties’ policies converge, therefore

,
constants.

,

where

Hence

and
. Moreover,

leading to

Since

are positive

and

for

and the following conditions hold:

measures the proportion of voters in the local election, and

Use (43) and (44) into (42) and re-arrange terms to show that the first order condition for
satisfies the following condition:
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Now consider an economy with party decentralization in open primaries and a nationwide government.
By (16) in Lemma 3 (which is equivalent to condition 20), the characterization of the first order condition
for this economy with

is given by:

In this equilibrium, the parties’ policies also converge then

and following similar steps as those

shown above imply that the first order condition in (46) can be expressed as follows:

Moreover, recall from condition (2) that

is is the

global maximizer of the aggregate well being of residents of district such that it is satisfied22

Therefore

Without loss of generality, the heterogeneity of preferences of voters for public goods means
.23 Moreover, conditions (45) and (2) imply that
imply

, and the expressions in (47) and (48)

. These outcomes and condition (49) means

22

See that condition (45) is equivalent to condition (2).
The heterogeneity of preferences means that, in general,
without loss of generality, we assume
23

or

. For the purpose of our analysis, and
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Theorem 3 The Decentralization Theorem does not hold in Majoritarian democracies with single member
districts and decentralized party systems with closed primaries.
Proof
A party
selects

seeking to form a central government in politically decentralized regimes with closed primaries
subject to
where

. By proposition 2,

is the policy that maximizes the nationwide surplus from

the fiscal exchange associated with a local public good in district . Condition (20) of Lemma 3 and
condition (2) from proposition 2 imply that, in general,
governments with party decentralization and closed primaries, party

. Similarly, in a system of local
selects

Condition (32) from Lemma 3 and condition (2) from proposition 2 show that, in general,
a result, in general, the nationwide aggregate wellbeing of voters satisfies the following

.
. As
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Table 6: Results of the Primary Models with Fiscal Decentralization Controls
(Error Correction Models with random effects, robust standard errors, and regional dummies)
Variable

Lagged Dependent
Variable
Democratic
Decentralization,
Party Centralization
(Lagged)
Municipal Plurality
(Lagged)
Municipal Directly
Elected Executive
(Lagged)
Fertility
(Differenced)
Fertility (Lagged)
Logged GDP per
capita (Differenced)
Logged GDP per
capita (Lagged)
Logged Population
Density
(Differenced)
Logged Population
Density (Lagged)
Urban Population
(Differenced)
Urban Population
(Lagged)
Expenditure
Decentralization
(Differenced)
Expenditure
Decentralization
(Lagged)
Revenue
Decentralization
(Differenced)
Revenue
Decentralization
(Lagged)
R²

Model 15

Model 16

Model 17

Model 18

Model 19

Model 20

Y= Diff.
Primary
Completion
Rate
(N=348, 48
countries)

Y= Diff.
Primary
School
Teachers
(N=391, 50
countries)

Y= Diff.
Preprimary
Enrollment
Rate
(N=653, 57
countries)

Y= Diff.
Primary
Enrollment
Rate
(N=669, 57
countries)

Y= Diff.
Secondary
Enrollment
Rate
(N=660, 54
countries)

Y= Diff.
Tertiary
Enrollment
Rate
(N=618, 54
countries)

-.192**
(.083)

-.031**
(.012)

-.049***
(.013)

-.076***
(.022)

-.024*
(.013)

.015
(.011)

-.151***
(.036)

.522
(.595)

.002
(.010)

.763**
(.304)

.151
(.194)

.352
(.338)

.449*
(.257)

-.104
(.082)

-.528
(.427)

-.001
(.012)

-1.17**
(.472)

-.326*
(.194)

-.578*
(.343)

-.455
(.341)

.107
(.081)

-.436
(.510)

-.009
(.011)

.049
(.346)

.282
(.196)

.023
(.311)

.111
(.319)

-.210**
(.087)

-2.99
(4.58)
-.335
(.506)
1.71
(4.46)
.583
(.555)

.017
(.100)
-.008
(.012)
.018
(.080)
.006
(.011)

2.91
(3.23)
-1.00**
(.422)
5.19
(3.77)
.626
(.473)

.319
(1.74)
.038
(.236)
6.43
(5.03)
-.428*
(.227)

-.097
(4.97)
-.171
(.298)
1.42
(3.77)
.588
(.394)

-.801
(1.62)
-.392*
(.220)
6.36**
(2.91)
.529**
(.253)

-.011
(.696)
.003
(.109)
.459
(1.01)
-.071
(.093)

-64.6
(40.2)

-.518
(.788)

32.8
(35.4)

5.41
(22.2)

15.1
(28.4)

-28.2
(21.1)

-.364
(9.48)

-.086
(.278)
-1.52*
(.887)
.002
(.035)

.011*
(.006)
.002
(.026)
.0003
(.0007)

-.049
(.197)
-1.06
(.663)
-.003
(.019)

-.067
(.078)
.206
(.542)
.021**
(.008)

-.098
(.119)
.193
(.595)
.020
(.020)

-.237**
(.110)
-.493
(.310)
-.002
(.010)

-.026
(.033)
.073
(.135)
-.005
(.004)

-3.55
(10.2)

-.243
(.287)

3.42
(11.2)

-12.2*
(6.56)

-22.8**
(11.2)

-11.5*
(6.60)

-.820
(1.68)

-18.8
(14.7)

.015
(.183)

4.25
(3.80)

3.19
(2.50)

-9.87**
(4.09)

-3.21
(2.90)

.212
(.601)

12.5
(14.2)

.292
(.287)

-10.3
(11.2)

13.6
(8.39)

18.2*
(9.74)

14.1**
(6.93)

-4.03*
(2.25)

18.4
(15.4)

.057
(.184)

-7.90*
(4.05)

-3.50
(2.50)

10.8**
(4.57)

1.17
(3.13)

-.116
(.634)

.145

.041

.091

.051

.050

.145

.155

***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10. All tests are 2-tailed. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis

Model 21
Y= Diff.
Children
Out of
School
(N=406,
42
countries)

